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Gender in the Regulatory Debates on
Embryonic Research in the Netherlands
Marta Kirejczyk
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ABSTRACT In contrast to many countries, the political debates in the Netherlands
on reproductive technologies and embryo research have paid particular attention
to the issue of health risks to women. This article focuses on the question to what
extent the discourse of gender has contributed to shaping the space for embryonic
(stem cell) research in this country. The author argues that in the policy arena flex-
ible conceptualizations of risks and burdens to women and of the identities of
embryos have been crucial in drawing and maintaining a discursive boundary
between the domains of medically assisted reproduction and embryo research.
The author shows that feminist intervention challenging this discursive strategy
has had an impact on the present regulation of research. However, the main weak-
ness of this temporary and partial feminist success is the virtual absence of a pub-
lic debate on the meaning and desirability of embryo research.
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The isolation of the first human embryonic stem cells by Thompson et al.
(1998) had a profound impact on the agenda of embryo research. Up to
that date, embryo research, where permitted, had been confined to the
problems related to infertility and its treatment and to congenital dis-
eases. The possible expansion of research beyond the domain of reproduc-
tive medicine was not to be taken for granted; it required new moral and
political justifications. In most countries where embryonic stem cell
research has eventually been authoritatively endorsed, the preceding
public and political debates were typified by a lack of focus on the health
hazards run by the women involved (Dickenson, 2006; Kulawik, 2003). In
this respect, debates in the Netherlands differed from those in other
European countries. In the Netherlands, the issue of the health risks to
women did form part of the argument in the debates on reproductive
technologies and on embryo research.
The emerging practice of embryo and embryonic stem cell research is the
subject of a growing number of social science and feminist studies. Some of
these studies deal with the attitudes of the (potential) donors, their under-
standing of the meanings of donation and the multi-interpretable concep-
tualizations of embryos in the context of in vitro fertilization (IVF) and
research (Krones et al., 2006; Parry, 2006). Other scholars focus on the evolv-
ing organizational, conceptual and cultural management of the passage of
embryos from IVF clinics to embryonic stem cell research labs. The move-
ment of embryos between fertility treatment and research is accompanied
by the emergence and proliferation of new forms of value embodied by
embryos. Embryos are thus valued not only as precious in the context of
fertility treatment but also become highly valued research material. At the
same time, shifts occur in the politics of hope – from hope for a child to
hope for new therapies and in the conceptualizations of health, bodily rela-
tions and social indebtedness (Franklin, 2006; Waldby, 2002).
It is noteworthy that in these analyses women and their specific posi-
tions in the process of donation hardly merit a distinguishable identity.
The articles of ethicists Cynthia Cohen (2000) and Donna Dickenson
(2006) form an important exception in this respect. The relative silence of
social scientists contrasts with the attention given in medical research
journals to women as donors of egg cells. Authors of these publications
are concerned about the shortage of fresh egg cells, the availability of
large numbers of which, they claim, is indispensable for the progress of
stem cell research. They discuss ethical issues involved in the procure-
ment of egg cells from healthy women. Some of them highlight the inad-
equacy of the current models of clinical- and research-informed consent
(Magnus and Cho, 2005). Others review the moral aspects of altruistic and
paid-for egg cell donations (Steinbrook, 2006), and still others argue openly
in favour of allowing financial compensation for donations (Robertson,
2006; Insoo Hyun, 2006) without which an adequate supply of this
valuable research material seems unlikely.
The presence of women’s health interests in the Dutch debates and their
long duration offer an opportunity to investigate to what extent a specif-
ically gendered discourse, in particular with regard to the health risks and
burdens to women, contributes to the shaping of the space for embryonic
(stem cell) research in this country. In order to shed some light on this
question, I analyse three significant events in the political process leading
up to the legal regulation of embryo research: the publication by the
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Health Council of the Netherlands of advisory reports in 1997 and 1998;
the consultative meetings organized in 1998 by the Ministry of Health
with regard to the recommendations of the Health Council; and the par-
liamentary debate that culminated in the passing of the Embryo Law in
2002. My analysis focuses on the interrelated shifts in conceptualizations
of risks, women’s interests and identities, the nature of embryos and the
permissibility of embryo research. As a background for understanding
these shifts, I start with a brief review of the earlier debates (1985–95).
PROCREATIVE DONATIONS: CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF
EMBRYOS AND NATURE OF RISKS
During this period, no moral distinction was made between naturally
conceived and IVF created embryos in discussions about reproductive
technology. All embryos were perceived as possessing an intrinsic ability
to develop into a child and therefore as meriting protection. Initially, out-
side feminist circles, little attention was devoted to the low success rate
and the health risks to women involved in the procedure (Kirejczyk,
1996). The hazards related to the use of IVF were seen as being of essen-
tially a social and psychological nature. They referred to situations that
diverged from the model of the stable heterosexual couple in reproductive
age, i.e. when single, lesbian or older women might claim the right to IVF,
or when a second woman participated in the medically assisted reproduc-
tion of that couple (as in surrogacy and egg donation). In all these cases,
it was the position of women, seen as deviant from the ‘natural’, that
could harm the development of a future child and undermine the social
order. In particular, reproductive egg cell donation was perceived as dis-
ruptive to the legally entrenched notion of unitary (biological and social)
motherhood (Kirejczyk, 2000).
If embryos were largely invisible in the discourse of the social and psy-
chological hazards of medically assisted reproduction, in the debates on
embryo research it was women who were made virtually invisible. The
central stage was pretty much reserved for embryos conceptualized as
independent entities with a status of their own. In the early reports of the
Health Council (1984, 1986), in the governmental policy paper (Minister
van Justitie, 1988) and in the parliamentary debates (Tweede Kamer,
1989), early embryos were described as human life that merited a certain
degree of respect and protection. Discursively, a difference was intro-
duced between spare embryos (the byproduct of IVF) and embryos spe-
cially created for research. The ethics of embryo research were discussed
abstractly, in terms of embryos’ non-instrumental and instrumental use.
As elsewhere, opinion was split on the issue of the permissibility of
embryo research. The opponents to research argued that respect for the
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embryonic form of human life required a full protection and excluded any
type of instrumental use of embryos. The cautious supporters of research
adhered to the view that an incremental protection of embryos was
needed. They argued that the moral value of embryonic life was relative
and that in exceptional, clearly defined cases, research on spare embryos
could be morally justified. They were inclined to support the eventual
legalization of such research. There was, however, unanimous agreement
that the creation of embryos for research, i.e. exclusively for instrumental
purposes, would amount to a morally unacceptable violation of the dig-
nity of the embryo and therefore should be banned.
The first challenge to this conceptual distinction came from minor left-
wing parties during the parliamentary debate of 1989. These parties
argued that it would be virtually impossible to enforce the proposed pro-
hibition on the creation of embryos for research. If spare embryos were
needed for research, then no one could guarantee that women treated
with IVF would not undergo excessive hormonal stimulation. These
women would not even know that they were being exposed to additional
health risks for the benefit of research (Tweede Kamer, 1989). These inter-
ventions restored the link between IVF practice and possible embryo
research. It became clear that women and their health would be directly
implicated in any type of embryo research.
WOMEN’S HEALTH INTERESTS
The placing of women’s health risks on the political agenda by the left-
wing parliamentarians corresponded with concerns raised during the
1980s by some feminists regarding the experimental character of IVF and
related health hazards (Direcks, 1986; Kirejczyk, 1987). Some years later,
in a series of advisory reports, the Health Council took up the issue of the
health risks related to IVF (Health Council, 1992, 1997a, 1998).
The recognition of the risks of IVF and the moral imperative to reduce
them constituted the main justification for the Health Council’s plea for
permitting research on spare embryos and on embryos specially created
for research purposes. Cryo-preservation and in vitro maturation of egg
cells played a prominent role in the Council’s argument. If developed,
these technologies promised to solve or at least to alleviate a number of
problems. Once introduced into IVF practice, they would considerably
diminish the need for numerous hormonal stimulations and egg cell
retrievals and consequently reduce the risks. At the same time, a morally
desired reduction in the numbers of spare embryos would be achieved. In
the eyes of the Health Council, the existing scarcity of donated egg cells,
and the objections related to obtaining them, further underscored the
importance of research into in vitro maturation and cryo-preservation.
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These new technologies would make egg cell donations safer, morally less
problematic and would also solve the problem of the expected scarcity of
egg cells donated for research and for procreation (Health Council, 1997a,
1998). In short, this type of research was not only relevant for the
improvement of IVF but also carried a great moral weight and therefore
merited endorsement. A significant part of that research did not require
the use of embryos. In the end, one would inevitably have to create
embryos from the cryo-preserved or in vitro matured egg cells in order to
establish the safety of the procedure for women and children (Health
Council, 1998).
CONSTRUCTING POTENTIAL DONORS
The reduction of the risks of IVF formed the main motive behind the
Health Council’s plea for the development of cryo-preservation and in
vitro maturation of egg cells. The development of these technologies
would not be possible without donated egg cells. Donations implied that
donors would have to go through a significant part of the IVF procedure
and would therefore be exposed to the same risks as infertile women
undergoing IVF and might even jeopardize their own fertility. Therefore,
was it morally admissible to request women to donate mature egg cells
either for reproduction or for research and assure that their interests were
not infringed? The answer to these questions was not straightforward.
The Council reflected on several categories of women that theoretically
could be recruited as donors.
The most controversial was the proposition of recruiting healthy young
women as donors. According to the Council, exposing these women to the
risky procedure for the benefit of infertile women was morally acceptable
as long as these donors did it voluntarily and were fully informed of the
risks (Health Council, 1997a). The opinion of the Council was divided
with respect to soliciting donations for research purposes. Some members
rejected such an eventuality as morally impermissible because in their
view the risks involved in donation were unacceptably high. Other mem-
bers of the Council argued that there was a parallel between egg cell
donations by this category of women and the participation of healthy per-
sons in medical research: both situations carried a certain amount of
health risks. From their perspective, there was nothing wrong in asking
healthy women to donate egg cells for research.
The second group of potential donors discussed was women undergo-
ing IVF. These women would not be exposed to additional health risks, as
one would ask them to donate some of the egg cells extracted during the
treatment. The donations might, however, diminish the likelihood of hav-
ing a child. The Council also voiced concerns regarding the voluntary
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character of such donations. If the aim of research was to improve fertil-
ity treatments, these women might see donation as assistance to their
companions in misfortune and often feel unable to decline the request
from their physician. So, asking women undergoing IVF to donate egg
cells for either research or treatment of other infertile women was only
morally permissible when a large number of egg cells was extracted and
when in earlier IVF cycles their rate of fertilization was high. The Council
stressed that none of the women should be exposed to a more intensive
stimulation regime than was needed for her treatment in order to increase
the number of mature egg cells, some of which could be donated for
research. In one situation, asking women undergoing IVF to donate egg
cells for research was defined as morally unproblematic, namely when in
the course of the treatment some egg cells failed to fertilize. A second
attempt to fertilize them could be undertaken, but using the resulting
embryos in the treatment was generally seen as irresponsible. This objec-
tion did not apply to second-time fertilization of egg cells for research
purposes, but one had to keep in mind that the possibly inferior quality
of those egg cells might make them unsuitable for some types of research
(Health Council, 1998).
In the Health Council discourse, the women undergoing sterilization or
other gynaecological surgery were perceived as the morally least prob-
lematic candidates for egg cell donations both for treatment and for
research. The objection of additional health risks did not apply to them;
during the surgery not more than one mature egg cell could be extracted,
thus allowing a very limited number of egg cells to be expected from
these donors (Health Council, 1998).
Two contrasting images of women’s identities emerge from the Health
Council’s discourse on the moral acceptability of donations. The
restrained position of the Council with regard to donations by women
undergoing IVF, the acceptance of risks run by healthy and fertile women
in passing on their egg cells to infertile women but not to researchers, and
seeing women undergoing sterilizations as the most suitable candidate
donors point in the same direction of motherhood as central to women’s
identity. On the other hand, there was also another image to which
women’s autonomy was more crucial than motherhood. Although safe-
guarding the autonomy of women in deciding on donation was stressed
by the Council as a whole, some of its members saw it as a sufficient con-
dition to legitimize requesting fertile young women to donate egg cells for
research. Those members saw no difference in the position of fertile egg
cell donors and of healthy participants in medical trials; both exposed
themselves to health risks for the benefit of others. This analogy is, how-
ever, disputable. Healthy people usually participate in the advanced
phases of medical research when the probability of therapeutic gains is
quite high. In contrast, egg cell donors would have to accept risks in order
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to furnish material for research, the therapeutic value of which is hypothetical
and can only be established in a distant future. The relative importance
attached by the Council to motherhood and autonomy depended upon
the context in which donations were discussed. In the context of repro-
duction, risks that might threaten the prospects of conceiving a child were
highlighted. In the context of research, the autonomous decision-making
by women was stressed.
The discourse of the Health Council presents the reader with a compli-
cated argumentative conundrum. On the one hand, the Council argues
that the reduction of the risks and burdens of IVF serves women’s health
interests. On the other hand, it accepts that health interests of other
women might be put at risk by exposing them to IVF in the procedure of
egg cell donation. Such donations are indispensable for developing novel
reproductive technologies, but it is highly unlikely that a sufficient num-
ber of donated egg cells will be available for their development. In addi-
tion, the safety of these new technologies for women could not be
established without creating embryos exclusively for research purposes.
The expected impact of those future technologies would not be limited to
a reduction of IVF risks but would also result in a reduction in numbers
of spare embryos potentially available for research. At the same time, also,
the burden of donations would be diminished and eventually more egg
cells, not embryos, could become available for research. This train of
thought leads to an unspoken conclusion that if one does not want to
impede further development of research, consent to egg cell donations
and to creation of embryos for research purposes is unavoidable.
LIBERATING EMBRYO RESEARCH FROM
REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH
In the late 1990s, the prospects of a novel and promising research
agenda appeared on the horizon. Embryonic stem cell research captured
the medical, public and political imagination. Practically from the very
beginning, embryonic stem cell research became discursively tied to the
promises of developing therapies for serious, incurable diseases such as
diabetes, Alzheimer’s and Parkinson’s diseases, and several heart and
liver conditions. Simultaneously, the question arose whether the use and
creation of embryos for research aiming at finding therapies for such
diseases were morally permissible. In the view of the Health Council,
the health interests at stake in this type of research were so important
that the use of spare embryos and, if necessary, also the creation of
embryos for research were justified. Consequently, the Health Council
recommended that in the future Embryo Law the list of permissible
aims of embryo research should be substituted by an open formulation:
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‘human embryos may be used only for research that serves important
health interests’ (Health Council, 1997b). The extended scope of permis-
sible research would cover stem cell research leading to new therapies,
to increased knowledge about the processes of embryonic development
and its disruptions, to knowledge about the origin of abnormalities and
disease and to a better understanding of the molecular regulation of
growth and differentiation of cells and research on the toxicity of new
drugs using stem cells. According to the Health Council, morally per-
missible embryo research no longer needed to be confined to the domain
of reproductive health. The possible impacts of such developments on
women, such as increased psychological and physical burdens, or the
emergence of new responsibilities to supply sensitive research material
were not explored by the Council.
The deliberations of the Health Council coincided with the preparation
of the draft Embryo Law and its recommendations went beyond the
earlier stated regulative intentions of the government. Before deciding
whether to endorse these recommendations, the Ministry of Health, in a
very unusual move, organized consultative meetings with medical, reli-
gious and societal organizations, to which patients, women’s and feminist
organizations were also invited. The consultations were structured around
two questions: was the proposed extension of the scope of research on
spare embryos justified and was the creation of embryos for research
morally permissible.
The outcome of these consultations showed a clear split of opinion. The
medical, scientific and research funding organizations fully supported the
recommendations of the Health Council. The religious organizations pre-
sented the perspectives of their faiths on the permissibility of using
embryos for research purposes and most of them came to the conclusion
that such use was not permissible. The majority of the representatives of
non-medical, lay organizations took a critical stance. They stressed that
only in exceptional cases and under strict conditions could research on
spare embryos be justified and that, in general, the creation of embryos
purely for research should be banned (Ministerie van VWS, 1998).
INFORMAL GENDER ASSESSMENT OF EMBRYO RESEARCH
From a gender perspective, the input of organizations explicitly address-
ing the issues of donations and of the type of research that should be pri-
oritized was most interesting. Freya, an organization of infertile patients,
the Netherlands Institute of Psychologists, the Women’s Health Centre
and the Society for Gender and Technology all highlighted the fact of the
scarcity of egg cells donated for reproductive purposes and saw the use of
these cells in research as unfair to infertile women.
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They criticized the Health Council for not paying attention to the
psychological implications of gamete and embryo donations for research.
The Netherlands Institute of Psychologists argued that people feel
strongly attached to their embryos, sperm and egg cells. They argued that
the donation of embryos for research could leave women unaware of the
fact that in the future they might regret their decision and experience feel-
ings of grief. The Society for Gender and Technology emphasized the psy-
chological impact of egg cell donations on women, which, in its view, was
more severe than the impact of donations on men. Not only was the pro-
cedure for extracting egg cells more drastic, but women felt more attached
to their gametes and their experiences of donation were different than
those of men donating sperm.
All those organizations agreed that if it was allowed, the scope of
research on spare embryos should be limited to the domain of reproduc-
tion. A slightly different opinion was voiced by the representative for the
Women’s Health Centre. She alleged that women’s health interests would
be better served by research into the prevention of infertility, by a follow-
up of IVF children and by a critical evaluation of the introduction of IVF
into clinical practice instead of extending the aims of embryo research. An
ample reflection on the desirability of future technologies and on the
question of whether their use would increase the burden on women
should precede each extension of the scope of research.
The Society for Gender and Technology shared this critique and indicated
that advances in genetics make translation of all kinds of illnesses into pro-
creative problems possible. The more diseases emerge as procreative prob-
lems, the greater is the burden for women. The culturing of stem cell lines
exemplified the trend of using artificial reproductive technologies for treat-
ing ever larger numbers of conditions unrelated to procreation.
The Society registered a gap between the moral considerations and
safety procedures developed in advisory reports and policy papers and
their application in practice as exemplified by the introduction of IVF.
Therefore, it demanded a guarantee that IVF stimulation protocols would
not be stealthily intensified and that women would not be asked to donate
such supernumerary egg cells. The Society also criticized the view that
informed consent would provide a sufficient guarantee for morally
responsible donations. It queried the appropriateness of the consent pro-
cedures being assessed and asked to what extent support would be avail-
able to women in decision-making about such weighty moral questions as
egg cell or embryo donations. Moreover, it suggested that the moral con-
sequences and responsibility for contributing to the development of novel
technologies were to a large extent placed on women’s shoulders. And,
finally, certain types of envisaged research would contribute to an
undesirable increase in medical and technical interventions in procreation
and pregnancy. In that context, one could not limit the discussion only to
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the instrumental use of embryos, but needed to include the interests of the
women involved.
The assessment of the impact on women of the potential relaxation of
the rules governing embryo research emerging from these contributions
encompassed a number of arguments new to the debate. First, the gen-
dered character of donations was stressed, not only by highlighting the
bodily and medical difference of egg cell and sperm donations but also by
underscoring the special meaning attached by women to their egg cells
and embryos. Second, it was argued that other research priorities would
better serve the health interests of women than the type of research dis-
cussed by the Health Council, which would undoubtedly exacerbate the
shortage of egg cells donated for procreation. Finally, a more fundamen-
tal critique had been formulated on the character and direction in which
embryo research was developing. It focused on reproductive processes as
the main source for understanding and – in the longer run – also for rem-
edying an increasing number of diseases unrelated to procreation. If
pursued, such research would contribute to the instrumentalization of
women, to the intensification of physical and psychological risks and
burdens and to the expansion of women’s moral responsibilities for
developing medical science.
These arguments, important as they were, represented the views of a
limited number of the organizations. In the preceding years, these issues
had been rarely debated by feminists and women’s health activists in
public. The consultation proceedings had not been formally published
and their circulation was limited. It is therefore perhaps not surprising
that they remained, for the most part, unechoed in the subsequent parlia-
mentary debate.
THE PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE AND CONCEPTUAL
METAMORPHOSIS OF EMBRYOS
Caught between the Health Council’s plea for a more liberal regulation of
embryo research and the critical attitudes of many of the consulted organ-
izations, the government drafted a conciliatory regulation. It defined the
aim of permissible research on spare embryos in general terms: the
increase of medical knowledge and proposed to introduce a temporary
ban on creating embryos for research. Lifting the ban was made depend-
ent upon reaching a satisfactory progress in research and a positive
change in public attitudes (Staatsblad, 2002).
The parliamentary debate on the Embryo Law demonstrated the polit-
ical impact of the Health Council’s discourse and a selective incorporation
of the earlier feminist critique of IVF into the mainstream political argu-
ment. All parliamentary parties agreed that health risks of IVF for women
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should be limited, but they differed as to how the reduction should be
achieved. The secular political parties adopted the discourse of the Health
Council, relating the reduction of risks to research on in vitro maturation
and cryo-preservation of egg cells and to the creation of embryos for that
type of research. They repeated that these technologies would contribute
to a decrease in the numbers of spare embryos, diminish the risk for the
donors, in consequence facilitating the obtaining of egg cells necessary for
research. The Christian parties did not negate the importance of such
research, but strongly objected to any form of research in which embryos
would be destroyed and to the creation of embryos for research as morally
inadmissible. Only the spokeswoman for the Green Left Party made
it explicit that allowing the creation of embryos for research on cryo-
preservation and in vitro maturation would open the door for the creation
of embryos for other research purposes. As some feminists had done before,
the party reiterated that egg cell donations for research would constitute an
instrumental use of women as producers of gametes (Tweede Kamer, 2001).
In the debate, any moral objections to the risks involved in donations and
the foreseeable difficulties in obtaining sufficient numbers of egg cells for
research were non-issues. Also, the broader gender implications of embryo
research such as an intensification of medical interventions in reproduction
caused by the growing demand for egg cells remained unaddressed.
Parliament did not consider the impact of embryo research on the emerg-
ing erosion of the ideal of an altruistic and voluntary donation and its grad-
ual replacement by a moral duty of women to donate. Those women whose
relatives were affected by diseases for which embryo research promises to
find therapies would risk coming under a sometimes indirect, but neverthe-
less real, pressure to donate.
The parliamentary debate revealed a substantial shift in the perception
of the nature of embryos since the late 1980s. In the earlier debates, med-
ically assisted reproduction formed the main context in which the nature
and the moral status of the embryo were discussed. As now, all parties
agreed that, if used for reproductive purposes, the crucial quality that
made embryos special was their intrinsic ability to develop into humans.
Such embryos merited protection. But here the agreement ended. The
position of the Christian parties remained stable over the years. For them
it did not matter whether such embryos were really placed in the womb
or left over; all should be fully protected and no research that could harm
embryos should be carried out on them.
The government and the non-Christian parties represented the view
that the moral value of embryos and the need for protection increased
with their development. This general view became more elaborated. The
minister of health stressed the double character of an embryo. At the very
beginning of its existence an embryo is a cell, but also a ‘human in the
making’ (Tweede Kamer, 2001). As humans in the making, embryos
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merited full protection. The requirement of full protection did not apply
to spare embryos, which would not have the possibility of becoming
‘humans in the making’. The lower degree of respect that these embryos
merited was expressed by limiting permissible research to the field of
medical science. Embryos created for research purposes would be
excluded from the very beginning of their existence from the possibility
of becoming babies. Those embryos deserved, according to the minister,
more protection than spare embryos and therefore research on them
would be restricted to a few listed areas of medical science. Therefore, the
earlier perception of embryos as possessing an intrinsic ability to become
a baby was substituted by a number of conceptualizations, each depend-
ing upon the context in which such embryos might find themselves.
The distinction between an embryo as a cell and an embryo as a human
in the making was taken up by the secular political parties. They intro-
duced several new conceptualizations of the embryo that were compatible
with those of the government. An early embryo was thus defined as ‘a
living tissue of human origin endowed with the potential to grow into a
human being’, as ‘living material of a human nature’ and as ‘a lump of
cells, an embryo in the making’. This lump of cells was a human life,
because it was neither animal nor vegetable (Tweede Kamer, 2001). In all
these new conceptualizations, embryos seemed to have no relation to
women or to procreation. Discursively emancipated and practically sepa-
rated from the woman’s body, the embryo began to lose its special status.
It underwent a metamorphosis from potential human being to human
tissue.
CHALLENGING DISCURSIVE BOUNDARIES
In the lengthy regulatory processes, two discursive strategies can be dis-
tinguished. The debates in the policy arena were characterized by draw-
ing a discursive boundary between the domain of medically assisted
reproduction and the domain of embryo research. Crucial to the mainten-
ance of the boundary between the two domains were shifts in the percep-
tion of risks, of women’s interests and identities and of embryos. In the
context of reproductive medicine, the risks of IVF were emphasized
against the background of the implicit assumption that motherhood was
central to women’s identity. A broadly shared moral obligation to reduce
those risks was linked to the promise that new technologies based on
embryo research would provide a looked-for solution. Once the demarca-
tion line between reproduction and research had been crossed, the
morally undesirable risks run by women undergoing IVF became morally
tolerable risks if run by women donating egg cells. In this context, not
motherhood but women’s autonomy came to the forefront. Importantly, it
European Journal of Women’s Studies 15(4)388
was argued that allowing the creation of embryos for research was in the
best interests of women.
The expected successful application of cryo-preservation and in vitro
maturation of egg cells in the domain of reproductive medicine would
give rise to problems within the research domain; namely, the shortage of
spare embryos potentially available for research. Within this domain, the
aims of embryo research not related to reproduction were hardly ques-
tioned and the quality of promises regarding future therapeutic benefits
was not assessed. On the contrary, those promises constituted a justifica-
tion of demands to allow the creation of embryos for research. The issue
of creating embryos for research was discursively linked to the question
of the moral status of an embryo and not to the question of egg cell dona-
tions that would be needed for that research or their implications for
women. When discussed in the research context, the embryo emerged as
unrelated human tissue to be handled with care. Once the discursive
boundary was crossed back into the domain of reproductive medicine, the
embryo recovered its status as ‘a human in the making’.
The strategy of constructing a discursive boundary between medically
assisted reproduction and embryo research was challenged in the feminist
contributions to the consultative meetings. They introduced a different
perspective on what constitutes women’s interest and grounded egg cells
and embryos firmly in the context of reproduction and the network of
meanings attached to them by women. It was not so much the status of an
embryo but the expected, for the most part negative, impacts of embry-
onic (stem cell) research on women that led feminists to reject the prospect
of allowing egg cell donations and the creation of embryos for research. In
contrast to the debates in the policy arena, the feminists participating in
the consultations also presented a critical assessment of the proposed
development of embryonic research. From their perspective, the current
direction of research, if continued, would contribute to the undesirable
increase of burdens and demands on women now and in the future.
The feminist intervention in the policy debate coupled with the
restrained attitude towards embryo research on the part of other non-
medical organizations proved partially successful in the short run. The
Embryo Law passed by parliament put a temporary ban on the creation
of embryos for research. But one must not forget that there was scarce
opportunity for the expression of feminist views; only the views of those
invited were represented and, most importantly, in the preceding years
the issue of embryo research and egg cell donation has barely been a sub-
ject of public discussion among feminists. If women want to claim a per-
manent voice in deciding the future of embryonic and reproductive
research, a broader debate is urgently needed. A prolonged absence of
such a debate will create a space for other interested parties to decide
which direction research will take.
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